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Abstract 
We employ conjoint analysis to understand how voters make decisions when faced with multi-dimensional 
choices. Respondents are asked to choose between candidates that vary along three valence (education, 
income and honesty) and two ideological attributes (attitudes toward tax and spending and the rights of 
same-sex couples). We have administered the conjoint analysis experiment to 186 subjects, resulting in 
5022 votes over pair-wise compared candidates. Our results indicate that education and integrity - but not 
income - indeed behave like valence issues where voters prefer more to less. They also show that voters’ 
preference takes the competency form. The marginal impact of valued valence attributes is conditional on 
the candidate’s positions on policy. It is higher where those positions are closer to those of respondents. 
Finally, when voters are faced with a stark choice between candidate holding different policy views, they 
are ready to trade a higher valence candidate, with whom they do not share policy views, with a lower 
valence one with whom they share such views. 
 
Valence matters in voting behaviour, but how exactly? A large body of scholarly research concludes that 
valence adds a second important dimension to the standard policy-based electoral competition. Valence 
issues have the peculiar property of voters having identical preferences over them. They all prefer more to 
less of a given valence attribute. They prefer more to less competent politicians; they prefer more to less 
honest politicians. Fittingly, Groseclose (2007) argues that valence adds ‘half’ a dimension to the standard 
one-dimensional Downsian model of electoral competition. 
Indeed, most formal models of electoral competition add a single and separable valence component to the 
voters’ utility function (e.g. Adams and Merrill III, 2009; Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr, 2000; Aragones and 
Palfrey, 2002, 2004; Castanheira et al., 2010; Groseclose, 2001; Londregan and Romer, 1993; Schofield, 
2003, 2007).  The utility   of voter   utility associated to a candidate C is therefore represented as 
  (  )       (|      |) 
where    is the valence attribute of candidate C, while the utility is a negative function of the difference 
between    and   , the voter’s and the candidate’s positions along a policy dimension (Groseclose, 2001). 
Voters hold homogeneous views with regard to the valence issue; and the policy and valence dimensions 
have the same saliency. Variants to this standard approach consist of including uncertainty over the valence 
advantage (Adams and Merrill III, 2009; Londregan and Romer, 1993), multiple policy dimensions 
(Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr, 2000), and policy-seeking politicians (Adams and Merrill III, 2009; Groseclose, 
2001). Only Groseclose (2001 appendix B) takes seriously the possibility that policy and valence 
components are not separable. In other words, he considers the case where voters appreciate a candidate's 
valence less when her policy position is far from the voter’s ideal point. For instance, the competence of a 
candidate with distant policy opinions has a lower value. 
These models are designed to produce expectations about the positioning of politicians on the policy-
valence space. As in the general class of Colonel Blotto games, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
when competition is both along policy and valence dimensions. 
Valence plays also a central role in the literature conceiving elections as screening mechanisms (e.g. Besley 
and Coate, 1997; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Fearon, 1999; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Mattozzi and Merlo, 
2008; Messner and Polborn, 2004). Galasso and Nannicini (2011) for instance assume that, in a one 
dimensional policy space, only centrist voters care about valence, while extreme voters choose their 
preferred party, regardless of its valence. This is equivalent of assuming that voters do not hold 
homogeneous views about valence, or that the weight of the valence dimension is strictly greater than zero 
only for a subset of voters. On the other extreme, Caselli and Morelli (2004)  propose a model of citizen-
candidates where valence is the only relevant dimension of competition. These works are primarily 
concerned with the selection mechanisms of specific types of low or high valence politicians. 
Regardless as to whether the focus is on competition or selection, these models rely on a set of 
assumptions about voting behaviour. But how exactly do voters behave in a multi-dimensional choice 
setting? How do they choose when confronted with candidates that embody more and less likable traits? In 
this article, we employ an experimental technique called conjoint analysis to understand how voters make 
decisions when faced with multi-dimensional choices. We have designed a so-called stated preference 
experiment where participants are asked to choose between candidates that vary along three valence 
(education, income and honesty) and two ideological attributes (attitudes toward tax and spending and the 
rights of same-sex couples). We have administered the experiment to 186 subjects, resulting in 5022 votes 
over pair-wise compared candidates.  Our results indicate that education and integrity - but not income - 
indeed behave like valence issues where voters prefer more to less. They also show that voters’ preference 
takes the competency form. The marginal impact of valued valence attributes is conditional on the 
candidate’s positions on policy. It is higher where those positions are closer to those of respondents. 
Finally, when voters are faced with a stark choice between candidate holding different policy views, they 
are ready to trade a higher valence candidate, with whom they do not share policy views, with a lower 
valence one with whom they share such views. 
In the next section, we formalize voters’ choice in a multidimensional space employing spatial voting 
theory, emphasizing the importance of separable and non-separable preferences and of saliency of the 
dimensions. We then introduce the design of the experiment, explain the estimation model and discuss the 
main results. 
Voter choice over candidates with multiple attributes 
Let   {     } be a set of candidates,   {     } a set of attributes, and    (  
      
 ) a  -tuple of 
values of attribute  , where   
  is the  th value of attribute   and      for   .   is the set of all attributes’ 
values and the cth candidate profile is denoted by a column vector of attributes’ values    (       )
 , 
where     is the value of attribute   for candidate c. For example, there may be five relevant attributes, 
such as education, integrity and position on taxation and spending, and each of these attributes can take 
any of three ordered values. The profile of a candidate can be characterized by low education, high 
integrity and a pro-taxation and spending position. 
The ideal candidate of a respondent   is represented by the column vector    (         ) , where     is 
her ideal value of attribute   and      . In a pairwise comparison of candidates’ profiles (i.e.     ), let 
  (  )   {   } be the potential binary outcome of respondent   over a candidate with profile   . The value 
of 1 represents that the respondent would choose the cth profile if she got the treatment   , while the 
value of 0 means that she would not choose such profile. Since respondents must choose one profile in 
each decision, ∑   (  )   
 
    for   .  Employing the weighted Euclidean distance of spatial voting theory 
(Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Hinich and Munger, 1997: 80), we have therefore, 
 
  (  )    iff ([     ]
   [     ])
 
 ⁄    ([      ]
   [      ])
 
 ⁄    , 
 
where    is a symmetric positive-definite matrix of order  .
1 The diagonal elements in    measure the 
salience attached by respondent   to each attribute, and the off-diagonal elements capture the interaction 
across attributes. If    is an identity matrix, respondent   attaches the same weight to each attribute and 
preferences are separable across attributes. If the diagonal elements in    take difference values, the 
respondent assigns more salience to some attributes in her voting decision. For instance, she may consider 
a candidate’s integrity more important than his income. In a bidimensional space, indifference contours 
take an elliptical rather than a circular shape. If the off-diagonal elements in    are different from zero, 
preferences are nonseparable and attributes interact. Attributes can be positive (negative) complements if 
a higher level of one attribute makes a respondent wanting more (less) of another attributes.2 For instance, 
a voter may value a candidate’s level of education more when the candidate shares the voter’s opinions on 
policy. If a candidate’s reputation is tainted, she may display more conservative attitudes on taxation and 
spending. 
A conjoint analysis voting experiment 
Conjoint analysis is a method that allows isolating the aspects that may influence a respondent’s choice in a 
multidimensional space. It originates from mathematical psychology (Luce and Tukey, 1964) and it has been 
extensively employed in marketing research and subfield of economics, such as transport economics, to 
measure consumer preference, forecast demand and develop new products (Green and Rao, 1971; Green 
et al., 2001; Hensher et al., 2005; Raghavarao et al., 2010). It has been applied only very recently to 
research questions in political science (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012; Hainmueller et al., 2012). 
We have designed a conjoint analysis voting experiment to assess how valence and ideology attributes of 
candidates affect voters’ choice. Respondents are subject to   choice tasks where they have to choose 
between two generically labelled candidates (candidates A and B). With generic labels, the unobserved 
components of the choice function are less likely to be cross-correlated and more likely to have the same 
distribution. Candidates are characterised by five attributes and each attribute takes three values, that is, 
  {   },    {     } and    (           ) where       .  
 
  
                                                          
1
 In case of equivalence, the respondent is indifferent between the two candidates and we assume that she flips a 
coin. 
2 Take the case of two attributes, the weighted Euclidean distance (WED) is   (      )
    (      )(      )  
  (      )
  , where       and   are respectively the ideal and candidate values and the salience weight of 
attribute       , while   the interaction between the attributes (the off-diagonal element in   ). Since 
     (      )⁄     (      )    (      ) , the marginal effect of the difference between the ideal and 
candidate values along attribute 1 is also a function of such difference in attribute 2 and of the sign of the interaction 
term  . The spatial model cannot not capture the possibility that sets of attributes may be nonseparable from other 
sets of attributes (Lacy, 2001: 240). 
Table 1. Attributes and attribute levels 
Attributes Attribute levels 
Education Junior high/middle school diploma (licenza media) 
High school diploma (diploma superiore) 
Univesity degree (laurea) 
Income  
 
Low (less than € 900 a month)  
Middle  
High (more than € 3000 a month)  
Other information The candidate has been convicted of corruption 
The candidate is under investigation for corruption 
No proceedings against the candidate 
Social services and taxation “More social services, even at the cost of higher taxes” 
“Maintain the level of provision of social services and taxation” 
“Cut taxes, even at the cost of fewer social services” 
Family law “Same rights to same-sex couples” 
“Some rights to same-sex couples” 
“No rights to same-sex couples” 
 
Three attributes are related to valence, while two are related to ideology or policy positions (see Table 1). 
The literature on valence offers a long list of possible factors, from the strength of the economy (e.g. 
Anderson, 2000; Butler et al., 1969; Florina, 1977; Lewis-Beck et al., 2008; Palmer and Whitten, 2000), to 
incumbency (e.g. Enelow and Hinich, 1982; Fiorina, 1981; Londregan and Romer, 1993), issue ownership 
(e.g Budge and Farlie, 1983; Clarke et al., 2004) and party unity (Clark, 2009). 
In light of the formal models reviewed above, we are however more interested in candidate-specific rather 
than contextual factors, more specifically, in attributes related to competence and integrity (e.g. Funk, 
1996, 1999; Kulisheck and Mondak, 1996; McCurley and Mondak, 1995). Rather than attributing directly 
the level of competence and ability to candidates, which would run the risk of being pleonastic, we employ 
education and income as valence factors. In several citizen-candidate selection models (Caselli and Morelli, 
2004; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Messner and Polborn, 2004), they are considered proxies for 
competence. The education attribute includes three levels of attainment (in Italy they are called licenza 
media, diploma superiore, laurea), while income levels are low, medium and high. Low income is specified 
as below €900 a month, which is approximately the second decile of the 2009 income distribution in Italy. 
High income is specified as above €3000 a month, approximately the ninety-fifth percentile.3 The last 
valence attribute is introduced as additional information, thus avoiding more laden terms such as integrity. 
A candidate may have been convicted of corruption, be under investigation for corruption or have a clean 
sheet. Candidates also differentiate along policy positions which are derived from the traditional liberal-
interventionist economic and liberal-conservative social dimensions (e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2006: 160; 
Kitschelt, 1994). For the former policy issue, candidates may want to increase the provision of social 
services, even at the cost of more taxation, to maintain the current levels, or to cut taxes, even at the cost 
of fewer social services. These issues are frequently the top priorities of government for Italian public 
opinion (European Commission, 2010: 24). For the latter policy issue, candidates may want to grant no 
family-related rights to same-sex couples, to grant these couples some rights or even the same rights as 
traditional families. Other issues, such as abortion and euthanasia, are captured by the liberal-conservative 
social dimension, but they are less subject to public debate in Italy.  
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 Eurostat. Distribution of income by quantiles, 2009 (Source: SILC) 
Table 2. Example of a choice task 
Question: For whom would you vote? 
 Candidate A Candidate B 
Education High school diploma High school diploma 
Income High (more than € 3000 a month)  Middle 
Other information 
The candidate is under investigation 
for corruption 
The candidate is under investigation 
for corruption 
Opinion on social services and 
taxation 
More social services, even at the cost 
of higher taxes 
Cut taxes, even at the cost of fewer 
social services 
Opinion on family law Some rights to same-sex couples Same rights to same-sex couples 
 
Table 2 illustrates an example of a choice task. Note that it does not offer the possibility of abstention. 
Although including this option would better reflect the situation in which voters find themselves, we are 
not interested in participation in this context. Our objective is to assess the impact of candidates’ attributes 
on voters’ choice. A no vote alternative is a hindrance for our analysis because the only information that 
can be derived from abstention is that the respondent would prefer not to choose. We do not obtain any 
information of why this is so. As Hensher, Rose and Green (2005: 176) argue, ‘by forcing decision makers to 
make a choice, we oblige decision makers to trade off the attribute levels of the available alternatives and 
thus obtain information on the relationships that exist between the varying attribute levels and choice’. 
Experimental design considerations 
A full factorial design is one in which all possible treatment combinations are enumerated (Hensher et al., 
2005: 109). With five attributes and three levels per attribute, we have 243 (i.e.   ) different treatment 
combinations or candidate profiles. Since we ask respondents to pairwise compare candidates, the full 
enumeration of choice tasks amounts to 29,403 combinations. Such a design is clearly unfeasible. We will 
therefore use only a fraction of these combinations, that is, a fractional factorial design.4  
The minimum number of treatment combinations is determined by the degrees of freedom we need for 
model estimation. Since the alternative candidates are unlabelled, the estimation of the main effects of five 
attributes requires at least six degrees of freedom for a linear model and, because each attribute takes 
three values, at least eleven degrees for a non-linear model. The addition of an interaction between two 
attributes requires the estimation of an additional parameter in case of a linear model and four additional 
parameters in case of a non-linear model. In other words, if we want to estimate the main effects and, say, 
two interactions, we required at least eight degrees of freedom for a linear model or nineteen for a non-
linear model. 
To produce a statistically efficient fractional factorial design, we need an orthogonal set-up where the 
columns display zero correlation (Hensher et al., 2005: 115). In other words, the levels that an attribute 
takes across all choice tasks should be statistically independent from the levels other attributes take. 
Orthogonality may demand a number of combinations that exceeds the minimum requirement imposed by 
the degree of freedom (in our case, nineteen for a non-linear model). However, for unlabelled designs, only 
within-alternative orthogonality needs to be maintained (Hensher et al., 2005: 152). In other words, the 
education attribute of candidate A across all the choice tasks does not need to be orthogonal to the 
                                                          
4
 The fractional factorial and orthogonal design is most widely used in the conjoint analysis literature. In introducing 
this method to political science, Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2012) argue for a fully randomized approach. 
Such approach is perhaps better suited for a public opinion analysis (see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2012) but less so in 
the more confined settings of an experimental design. 
education attribute of candidate B. Another appreciable feature of an experimental design is that it should 
be balanced. Each level of any given attribute should appear the same number of times. 
Since we require only within-alternative orthogonality, we generated a main-effects orthogonal design for 
five attributes and three levels each attribute, setting at twenty-seven the minimum number of cases 
(rows). The design is balanced because each level of each attribute appears nine times. We have assigned 
attributes to the columns of the design in order to ensure statistically efficient estimations of the main 
effects and of the interactions between education and the two policy dimensions (for the details on the 
procedure see Hensher et al., 2005: 127-150). Seven out of the possible ten two-way interactions between 
attributes display zero correlation with the main effects. Several interactive terms are also uncorrelated. 
This means that potentially we could test efficiently several alternative specifications. We have now 
twenty-seven orthogonal profiles of candidate A. We have then randomized the sequence of these profiles 
and assigned them to candidate B, making sure that the randomized combination does not match the 
original. This procedure ensures within-alternative orthogonality (Hensher et al., 2005: 152). 
The core of the experiment consists in twenty-seven choice tasks where respondents are requested to 
choose between two candidates’ profiles. The order of the attributes, as it appears in Table 2, does not 
change for each respondent in order to ease cognitive burden, but the sequence of tasks is randomized 
across respondents in order to minimise primacy and recency effects.5 
The only applications of conjoint analysis in political science is in the field of public opinion (Hainmueller 
and Hopkins, 2012; Hainmueller et al., 2012). In light of the formal literatures reviewed above, our interest 
is more circumscribed. We want to analyze how respondents reconcile candidates’ valence and policy 
attributes in their voting choices. Although trade-offs may differ across types, we are less interested in how 
different types of the respondents prefer different candidates. Given the nature of our inquiry, a set of 
relatively homogeneous respondents allows us to control for unobservables and to minimize the risk of 
omitted variable bias at the stage of model estimation. We have therefore involved 186 undergraduate 
students in the period between February and May 2012. The online survey experiment has been 
administered by the Opinion Polls Laboratory (Laboratorio Indagini Demoscopiche) of the Università degli 
Studi di Milano.  
Estimation 
To estimate how candidate attributes influence the choice of respondents, we employ a binomial model 
with a conditional logit link function. Voting is assumed to be generated by a Bernoulli process. The 
stochastic component of the model is therefore              (   |   ), where       (     | ) for 
respondent   and candidate  . The systematic component is 
     
    [(∑      )                     (    )   ]
 
   
∑         [∑      )                     (    )   ]
 
   
  
where     is the value of attribute   for candidate c, with the interactions between education (   ) and 
the two policy dimensions (       ),       is the Hadamard product of row vectors of betas and socio-
                                                          
5
 As Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2012) point out, this design requires two further assumptions. First, there is 
no carryover effect within respondents. The potential outcomes in each trial are independent from the outcomes in 
other trials, as long as the attributes’ values do not change. In other words, the respondents would choose the same 
candidate in the pairwise comparison of a given trial regardless of the candidate profiles she had seen or would see in 
the rest of the experiment. Second, there is no profile-order effect. The ordering of profiles does not affect the 
outcomes in any manner. Differently ordered profiles would produce the exact same outcomes as long as the 
attributes’ values are the same. 
demographic and political characteristics6 of the respondent  , while    is the column vector of attributes 
of candidates. 
Valence, ideology and voting 
Interest in politics, ideology, saliency and voting 
The results of the estimation are reported in the Appendix (Table A). We first analyze if the first three 
attributes indeed behave like valence issues where voters prefer more to less, and the last two attribute 
display the features of policy issues that split voters in different groups. Figures 1a to 1c display the 
marginal effects of attributes of candidates on the probability that respondents vote for a particular 
candidate, at different levels of respondents’ interest in politics, left-right self-placement and issue saliency. 
The dots indicate the mean predicted probabilities and the lines the 95% confidence intervals. 
<Figures 1a to 1c> 
Better educated candidates are more likely to be chosen by respondents that lean towards the left and 
attach high importance to education.7 Assuming intermediate values on other attributes,8 a candidate with 
a university degree is 33.9 percentage points more likely to win support from a left-wing respondent than 
one with a junior high school diploma, with a 95% confidence interval from 16.4 to 45.2. Such candidate is 
not significantly more likely to be chosen by a right-wing respondent. When education is highly valued as an 
attribute, a candidate with a university degree is 34.2 percentage points more likely to win support, with 
the estimate ranging between 18 and 44.8, but she would not be preferred if the respondent attached only 
limited importance to education. 
Income does not play any role in affecting choice. If anything, high income is a liability rather than an asset. 
In a similar model that excludes the interaction between education and policy positions (see Table B in the 
Appendix – to be included), a low income candidate is actually preferred to a high income one by 
respondents with left-leaning inclinations, attaching high saliency to this attribute, but only moderately 
interested in politics.9 A high income candidate was 14.6 percentage points less likely to be chosen than a 
low income one. 
Indeed, candidates of dubious integrity are heavily penalized. A candidate under investigation is 35.8 
percentage points less likely to be chosen than a clean one. If corrupt, the figure increases to 49.8 
percentage points. Integrity is an important attribute for the large majority of respondents but, even in this 
clear-cut case, there are interesting nuances. Respondents that are more right-leaning and only moderately 
interested in politics are readier to tolerate an investigated candidate when confronted with a clean one 
that is disliked on other dimensions.10 
Both economic and social issues clearly split respondents along the left-right axis. Assuming intermediate 
values on other attributes, a candidate proposing to cut spending and taxation is 38.8 percentage points 
less likely to win support from a left-wing respondent (more so if working and male), and 33.2 percentage 
points more likely to win support from a right-wing respondent than a candidate proposing more taxation 
and spending.11 Respondents with less interest in politics, but attaching high relevance to this issue, also 
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 As socio-demographic traits, we included gender, age, nationality, working status and high school education; as 
political traits, interest in politics, left-right self-placement, and saliency attached to attributes. 
7
 They are also full-time students coming from a lyceum. 
8
 In computing marginal effects, we also assume that the socio-demographic and political characteristics of 
respondents that are not object to analysis take the mean or mode value. 
9
 They also hold Italian nationality and have studied in a lyceum. 
10
 Non-Italian male respondents display greater tolerance as well. 
11
 Female full-time students which are less interested in politics but attach importance to this policy prefer candidates 
maintaining the current levels of taxation and spending. 
prefer a status-quo biased than a spendthrift candidate.12 A candidate arguing that no rights should be 
recognized to same-sex couples is 50 percentage points less likely to win support from a left-wing 
respondent (more so if Italian and female) and 33 percentage points more likely to win support from a 
right-wing respondent than a candidate proposing the same rights as traditional families. A respondent that 
considers this issue highly salient also prefers a candidate proposing full rather than partial recognition of 
rights. 
Interaction among education and policy attributes 
These results indicate that two attributes capture important valence features while the two policy 
attributes indeed split voters in different groups. These results are not meant to be generalizable to a larger 
population. Actually, for the purpose of our inquiry, greater homogeneity on some socio-demographic 
traits of the sampled respondents allows us to better control for unobservables and to minimize omitted 
variable bias. We can therefore analyze more neatly how respondents trade-off between attributes 
(Hensher et al., 2005). For instance, following Groseclose (2001), do preferences take a competency form, 
where voters appreciate a candidate's valence less when her policy position is far from the voter’s ideal 
point? 
<Figures 2a and 2b> 
The interactions between education, our proxy for competence, and policy positions are displayed in 
Figures 2a and 2b.13 If a candidate holds pro-taxation and spending views, she is between 26.7 and 33.7 
percentage points more likely to be voted if she has a university rather than a junior-high school diploma. If 
a candidate holds more prudent views, higher education does not provide him with an advantage (see 
Figure 2a upper panel). Similarly, if a candidate is in favor of granting same-sex couples the same rights as 
traditional families, she is between 23.9 and 33.8 percentage points more likely to be voted if she has a 
university rather than a junior-high school diploma. If a candidate holds more conservative views, higher 
education does not provide him with an advantage (see Figure 2b upper panel).  In sum, the impact of 
education on the likelihood of choosing a candidate is conditional on the candidate’s positions on policy. It 
is much higher where those positions are closer to those of our respondents. 
Conversely, education becomes important in sanctioning. If a candidate has only a junior high education, 
respondents are between 35.1 and 35.2 percentage points less likely to support a candidate that wants to 
cut, rather than to increase, tax and spending. But if she is better educated, respondents are not more 
likely to prefer a spendthrift over a prudent candidate (see Figure 2a lower panel). Similarly, a candidate 
that prefers partial rather than full recognition of same-sex couple rights is between 21.3 and 21.4 
percentage points less likely to be voted if she has only a junior high school diploma, but she is not 
penalized if she is better educated (see Figure 2b lower panel). In other words, respondents are more 
tolerant toward better education candidates, with whom they may not share policy views. 
Tragic choices 
Candidates with dubious traits frequently run at the elections, and win. We illustrate here the difficult 
choices that voters face in these circumstances and why these candidates may eventually win office. For 
our respondents, the ideal candidate has university education, middle income, and a clean sheet; she 
prefers more taxation and spending and the same rights to same-sex couples. We compare candidates that 
hold these policy positions, but have lower valence, with higher valence candidates holding different policy 
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 Female full-time students which do not come from a lyceum share this view. 
13
 This analysis is done for our typical respondent, an Italian female full-time student with a fair interest in politics and 
left-of-center views. She also twenty-one years old, comes from a lyceum and attaches high saliency to the integrity 
and spending dimensions, fair saliency to education and couple rights, and some importance to income. 
views. Figure 3 displays the marginal effects of choosing the latter types of candidates, given the former 
types; in other words, the changes in the probability of preferring a high valence candidate with different 
policy views over a lower valence candidate with ideal policy views. The traits of higher valence candidates 
are described on the right-hand side of Figure 3; those of lower valence are on the left-hand side. If the 
marginal effect is lower (higher) than zero, respondents are less (more) likely to prefer the higher valence 
candidate. 
The upper panel in Figure 3 lists the starker choices. The alternative higher valence candidates on the right-
hand side hold relatively extreme views. They want to cut taxation and spending and to grant no rights to 
same sex couples. Respondents are 6 percentage points less likely to prefer a candidate with this profile 
than a corrupt one that shares their policy views. The figure increases to 55 percentage points if the 
candidate in only under investigation. This result is a very notable because it is based on the most common 
traits on our respondents, who display a fair interest in politics and left-of-center views. Earlier we showed 
greater tolerance towards candidates with dubious integrity by respondents that are more right-leaning 
and only moderately interested in politics.14 Moreover, better education is clearly trumped over if the 
policy views of a candidate are disliked. Respondents are between 58.8 and 70.6 percentage points less 
likely to prefer such a candidate compared to a less educated one with ideal policies. 
The lower panel in Figure 3 lists less stark choices. The alternative higher valence candidates on the right-
hand side hold moderate policy views. They want to maintain the level of taxation and spending and to 
grant some rights to same sex couples. Yet, even in these circumstances, valence plays a key role only in the 
most blatant case. Respondents are 70.3 percentage points more likely to prefer a clean moderate 
candidate to a corrupt one who shares their policy views. In the other circumstances, the valence 
advantage, in terms of integrity or education, is not enough to sway to significantly sway the choices of 
respondents. 
Overall, this analysis indicates the highly conditional impact that valence attributes have on voting 
behaviour. 
Conclusion 
This work provides some initial indications of whether some candidates’ attribute do indeed behave like 
valence issues where voters prefer more to less. Education and integrity clearly display these features. It 
also shows that voters’ preference takes the competency form. The marginal impact of valued valence 
attributes is conditional on the candidate’s positions on policy. It is higher where those positions are closer 
to those of respondents. Finally, we showed that when voters are faced with a stark choice between 
candidate holding different policy views, they are ready to trade a higher valence candidate, with whom 
they do not share policy views, with a lower valence one with whom they share such views. 
We are currently replicating this experiment with a similar set of respondents. We may extend to the full 
population in the medium term, with the use of instrument like Mechanical Turk. 
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 Of course, this is not a statement that we wish to generalize. That was the general attitude of respondents at the 
time of running the survey. It could well be the opposite in other contexts. What matter for our purposes is the 
readiness of respondents to trade valence with policy views. 
Figure 1a Interest in politics and attributes of candidates 
 
Note: Marginal effects on the probability of voting a candidate with different attributes (horizontal axis) for different levels of interests in politics. 
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Figure 1b Left-right self-placement and attributes of candidates 
 
Note: Marginal effects on the probability of voting a candidate with different attributes (horizontal axis) for different ideologies. 
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Figure 1c Saliency and attributes of candidates 
 
Note: Marginal effects on the probability of voting a candidate with different attributes (horizontal axis) for different levels of saliency.
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Figure 2a Interaction between Education and Views on Taxation and Spending 
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Figure 2b Interaction between Education and Views on Same-sex Couples Rights 
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Figure 3 Tragic choices 
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Appendix 
TABLE A: Voting, valence and policy attributes 
     
High school diploma -0.819 
 
(1.056) 
Laurea 0.0236 
 
(1.007) 
Middle income 0.445 
 
(0.960) 
High income -0.181 
 
(0.930) 
Under investigation 1.672 
 
(1.992) 
No proceedings 1.642 
 
(1.225) 
Keep spend and tax levels 2.968*** 
 
(1.017) 
Cut taxes and spending 0.957 
 
(0.976) 
Some rights to same sex couples -0.713 
 
(0.839) 
No rights to same sex couples -2.214* 
 
(1.137) 
Interest in politics X High school diploma -0.0549 
 
(0.158) 
Interest in politics X University degree -0.209 
 
(0.149) 
Interest in politics X Middle income 0.0840 
 
(0.156) 
Interest in politics X High income 0.150 
 
(0.152) 
Interest in politics X Under investigation -0.203 
 
(0.243) 
Interest in politics X No proceedings -0.265* 
 
(0.147) 
Ideology X High school diploma -0.0444 
 
(0.0450) 
Ideology X University degree -0.0901** 
 
(0.0423) 
Ideology X Middle income -0.0560 
 
(0.0455) 
Ideology X High income 0.0424 
 
(0.0430) 
Ideology X Under investigation 0.0747 
 
(0.0688) 
Ideology X No proceedings 0.311*** 
 
(0.0411) 
Male X High school diploma 0.0204 
 
(0.211) 
Male X University degree 0.291 
 
(0.201) 
Male X Middle income -0.146 
 
(0.210) 
Male X High income -0.193 
 
(0.205) 
Male X Under investigation 0.475 
 
(0.323) 
Male X No proceedings 0.370* 
 
(0.198) 
Age X High school diploma 0.0233 
 
(0.0316) 
Age X University degree 0.0317 
 
(0.0300) 
Age X Middle income 0.00468 
 
(0.0294) 
Age X High income 0.00264 
 
(0.0285) 
Age X Under investigation 0.0187 
 
(0.0441) 
Age X No proceedings 0.0425 
 
(0.0281) 
Italian X High school diploma -0.144 
 
(0.412) 
Italian X University degree -0.312 
 
(0.406) 
Italian X Middle income 0.104 
 
(0.434) 
Italian X High income -0.217 
 
(0.411) 
Italian X Under investigation -0.837 
 
(0.653) 
Italian X No proceedings -1.985*** 
 
(0.362) 
Student X High school diploma 0.0687 
 
(0.219) 
Student X University degree 0.263 
 
(0.205) 
Student X Middle income 0.187 
 
(0.209) 
Student X High income 0.145 
 
(0.207) 
Student X Under investigation 0.648** 
 
(0.324) 
Student X No proceedings 0.519** 
 
(0.204) 
Lyceum X High school diploma 0.630** 
 
(0.263) 
Lyceum X University degree 0.457* 
 
(0.239) 
Lyceum X Middle income -0.524** 
 
(0.250) 
Lyceum X High income -0.421* 
 
(0.241) 
Lyceum X Under investigation 0.0395 
 
(0.386) 
Lyceum X No proceedings -0.00292 
 
(0.232) 
Saliency X High school diploma 0.152 
 
(0.115) 
Saliency X University degree 0.313*** 
 
(0.118) 
Saliency X Middle income -0.0612 
 
(0.115) 
Saliency X High income -0.152 
 
(0.102) 
Saliency X Under investigation -0.683** 
 
(0.345) 
Saliency X No proceedings -1.110*** 
 
(0.217) 
Interest in politics X Maintain tax and spend -0.319** 
 
(0.134) 
Interest in politics X Cut tax and spend -0.272** 
 
(0.132) 
Interest in politics X Some same-sex rights -0.0374 
 
(0.129) 
Interest in politics X No same-sex rights -0.0806 
 
(0.159) 
Ideology X Maintain tax and spend 0.149*** 
 
(0.0406) 
Ideology X Cut tax and spend 0.260*** 
 
(0.0384) 
Ideology X Some same-sex rights 0.200*** 
 
(0.0376) 
Ideology X No same-sex rights 0.544*** 
 
(0.0478) 
Male X Maintain tax and spend -0.782*** 
 
(0.182) 
Male X Cut tax and spend -0.338* 
 
(0.180) 
Male X Some same-sex rights 0.474*** 
 
(0.173) 
Male X No same-sex rights 1.084*** 
 
(0.219) 
Age X Maintain tax and spend -0.0478* 
 
(0.0271) 
Age X Cut tax and spend -0.0241 
 
(0.0260) 
Age X Some same-sex rights -0.00447 
 
(0.0240) 
Age X No same-sex rights -0.00953 
 
(0.0362) 
Italian X Maintain tax and spend -0.482 
 
(0.379) 
Italian X Cut tax and spend -0.888** 
 
(0.381) 
Italian X Some same-sex rights 0.380 
 
(0.350) 
Italian X No same-sex rights -0.739* 
 
(0.425) 
Student X Maintain tax and spend 0.503*** 
 
(0.183) 
Student X Cut tax and spend 0.553*** 
 
(0.182) 
Student X Some same-sex rights -0.187 
 
(0.177) 
Student X No same-sex rights 0.231 
 
(0.225) 
Lyceum X Maintain tax and spend -1.234*** 
 
(0.219) 
Lyceum X Cut tax and spend -0.704*** 
 
(0.206) 
Lyceum X Some same-sex rights 0.0907 
 
(0.206) 
Lyceum X No same-sex rights 0.420 
 
(0.269) 
Saliency X Maintain tax and spend 0.0175 
 
(0.163) 
Saliency X Cut tax and spend -0.168 
 
(0.153) 
Saliency X Some same-sex rights -0.214** 
 
(0.0965) 
Saliency X No same-sex rights -0.530*** 
 
(0.129) 
High school diploma X Maintain tax and spend 0.287 
 
(0.269) 
High school diploma X Cut tax and spend 0.552 
 
(0.408) 
University degree X Maintain tax and spend -0.357* 
 
(0.204) 
University degree X Cut tax and spend -0.153 
 
(0.214) 
High school diploma X Some same-sex rights -0.335 
 
(0.292) 
High school diploma X No same-sex rights 0.140 
 
(0.325) 
University degree X Some same-sex rights 0.100 
 
(0.316) 
University degree X No same-sex rights -0.242 
 
(0.475) 
  Observations 8,362 
Pseudo-R2 0.395 
Log-likelihood -1752 
Wald chi2 2292 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Dependent variable: Pr(Y=1). Probability of choosing a candidate with given attributes. 
 
 
 
 
 
